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NOTE
AN RX FOR REFORM: A MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT
JenniferRakt
SENIORS IN THE UNITED STATES are boarding buses
to Canada to buy prescription drugs.' Faced with expenditures
for medications that place an increasing demand on their limited
income, many elderly persons are getting tickets on rented
buses to visit Canadian physicians and pharmacies.2 They can
save as much as ninety percent on needed medications, with a
busload of fifty seniors saving as much as $48,000 a year.3 This
strange trend is likely to continue as the elderly in the United
States search for a way to pay for their prescription drug expenses, not covered by Medicare, the government health insurance program for the aged.

INTRODUCTION
The Medicare program is facing serious problems in controlling costs and providing adequate coverage, including the
prospect of future insolvency of the Medical Insurance Trust
Fund.4 However, reform prospects are hampered by political
t J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
1 See Susan Jaffe, More Buses Head North for PrescriptionDrugs, PLAIN
DEALER, Sept. 4, 2001, at B3.
2 See id. Filling prescriptions in Canada to bring to the United States is not
illegal, but requires that the person first visit a Canadian physician to prescribe the

medication.
Id.
3

id.
4 See Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security RetirementAges: Weighing the Costs and Benefits, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 544 (2001) (predicting that the
Social Security program will become insolvent by 2037 "unless corrective action is
taken"); see also BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND Dis-

ABILrIY INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 3-4 (2000) (noting how long
various trust funds are expected to be in operation before becoming insolvent).
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and theoretical differences on how to "save" Medicare. 5 Over
the next few years, one area of Medicare reform that is likely to

receive much attention and debate is the provision of outpatient
prescription drug coverage under Medicare. This Note reviews
four proposals for adding a prescription drug benefit to Medicare that are presently before Congress. 6 Each of these proposals is the result of earlier efforts at Medicare reform, and as

such, provides a perspective on policy development.7 These
proposals offer an opportunity to compare various structural and
theoretical approaches to a federal prescription drug program
for the elderly and Medicare reform more generally.
As prescription drug expenses grow, they increasingly impact the elderly.8 Because the federal government has been slow
to respond with Medicare legislation, the States have started to9

experiment with various types of drug assistance programs.
These state programs offer examples and lessons for a federal

response. Yet they also demonstrate the need for a more uni-

form and encompassing approach to coverage of drug costs for
the elderly.
This Note examines the need for prescription drug coverage
for Medicare beneficiaries. It reviews previous efforts at introducing a drug benefit to Medicare with a particular emphasis on
the difficulties of enacting major Medicare legislation. The next
section focuses on state efforts to provide prescription drug
coverage and assistance, and analyzes the benefits and limita5 See Robin Toner, Major Battle Looms Over Medicare,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2001, at A34.
6 These include two from the Senate, S.10, 107th Cong. (2001) and S. 358,
107th Cong. (2001), and two from the House of Representatives H.R. 339, 107th
Cong. (2001) and H.R. 803, 107th Cong. (2001).
7 See generally Mark McClellan et al., Designing a Medicare Prescription
DrugBenefit: Issues, Obstacles, and Opportunities, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at
26, 28-29 exh.1 (outlining the key features of the bills that have been introduced in
Congress); MICHAEL E. GLUCK, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A SIDE-BYSIDE COMPARISON OF SELECTED MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE PROPOS-

ALS (Aug. 2000) (same), available at http:llwww.kff.org/content/2000/1601/sideby
side.pdf.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE, SPENDING, UTILIZATION, AND PRICES, at exec. summ.

(Apr. 2000) (discussing how the rising costs of newly developed prescription drugs
are preventing elderly and disabled Medicare beneficiaries from acquiring such
drugs) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT], available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.govhealth/reports/drugstudy/.
9 Robert Pear, States CreatingPlans to Reduce Costs for Drugs: Benefit for
the Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at Al.
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tions of state action, concluding that federal action is necessary.
The next section discusses the major policy concerns and establishes a framework for considering various aspects of a Medicare benefit. This is followed by a review and evaluation of the
proposals within the policy framework. From this analysis, the
Note offers a perspective on which aspects are best suited for
providing prescription drug coverage under Medicare.
The discussion and analysis of adding a prescription drug
benefit to Medicare may be useful in considering broader Medicare reforms. While describing specifics of a prescription drug
benefit, the analysis highlights a number of themes in the debate
about Medicare reform more generally. These include whether
Medicare should be viewed as a social insurance benefit program, or whether in order to control costs, it should be treated
more like a welfare program. Another theme is the role that the
government or private markets should play in the structure and
functioning of the Medicare program. Finally, the addition of a
prescription drug benefit exemplifies the tension of attempting
to control the growing costs of providing needed medical care
while ensuring that needed care is available.

THE NEED FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG
COVERAGE AMONG MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES
As the federal health insurance program for the elderly,
Medicare provides coverage for inpatient medical services under Medicare Part A. 10 It also covers many outpatient medical
services with voluntary enrollment under Medicare Part B, in
which most Medicare recipients opt to enroll.11 Medicare does
not cover outpatient prescription drugs as a part of the covered
mandated benefits package.
A. The Rise of Prescription Drug Use
When Medicare was enacted in 1965, prescription drug
coverage was not a common component of health insurance.
10

THEODORE MARMOR, THE PoLiTIcs OF MEDICARE 201 (Aldine De Gruyter,

2d ed. 2000).
11See id.

12 MICHAEL E. GLUCK, NAT'L ACAD. OF Soc.

DRUG BENEFrr, BRIEF

INs., A MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
No.1, at 1 (Apr. 1999), availableat http://www.nasi.org/Medi

care/Briefs/medbrl.htm.
13 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 1.
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Drug therapies were not as prevalent or as effective as they are
now. 14 They have become an increasingly important part of
health care coverage. 15 As one study describes:
From a clinical perspective, the lack of a prescription drug benefit when Medicare was implemented did
not constitute as much of a barrier to effective health
care as it does today. In the late 1960s comparatively
few of the prescription drugs available had clinically
significant effects on the chronic diseases that are
prevalent among the elderly. Since then, however, researchers have made much progress in understanding
the pathophysiology of many chronic diseases. Combined with major advances in our ability to identify and
create new pharmaceutical products, this has resulted in
an enormous increase in the number of drugs6 that are
available for both chronic and acute diseases.
Over the last century, vaccine development and drug treatment have revolutionized medicine. 17 Diseases such as smallpox
and polio have essentially been eradicated due to vaccines.
Drug treatments for many diseases and ailments have been developed. Drug therapies can replace surgeries, lower cholesterol
and provide chronic pain relief.18 Drug therapies may substitute
for more expensive medical interventions19 , provide previously
unavailable treatment 2° , or facilitate the use of other medical
interventions.21
In recent years, the use of drug therapies has rapidly expanded, increasing the dependence on this form of treatment.22
One measure of this explosion is the dramatic growth in spending on prescription drugs. Between 1993 and 1998, drug spend14See Earl P. Steinberg et al., Beyond Survey Data:A Claims-BasedAnalysis
of Drug Use and Spending by the Elderly, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 198, 199.
15 Sharon Levine et al., Kaiser Pennanente's Prescription Drug Benefit,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 185.
16Steinberg, et al., supra note 14, at 199.
17See Jerry Stanton, Comment, Lesson for the United States from Foreign
Price Controlson Pharmaceuticals,16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 152 (2000).
18 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 1.

19 See Stanton, supra note 17, at 152 (listing various examples).
See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 1 (promising more innova-

20

tive therapies in biotechnology and genetic research).
2! See id.

22 See Steinberg, et al., supra note 14, at 199.
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ing increased by eighty-four percent.2 3 During the year 2000,
prescription drug spending increased by 17.3% to $121.8 billion.24 The increased spending on drug therapies is driven in
part by volume, although prices are also a factor.2 5 According to
a report by the National Institute for Health Care Management
Foundation, there are three factors contributing to this rise in
spending.26 The first is an increase in the number of prescriptions written by physicians.2 7 This accounts for nearly forty-two
percent of the increase in spending.2 8 The second is the use of
more expensive and popular drugs, accounting for about thirtysix percent of the increase in spending. 29 As popular drugs account for greater market share control, pharmaceutical companies increasingly use advertising, which in turn leads to higher
costs.
Finally, general price increases have contributed to the
overall increase in spending. 30 These cost increases have led to
higher premiums for health insurance. 31 They have also increased demands on, and the cost of, Medicaid programs, the
state health care programs for the poor.3 2
Another indication of the growth in the use of prescription
drugs is the number of new drugs being approved by the Food
and Drug Administration. Between 1966 and 1970, the first five
years of Medicare's existence, the Food and Drug Administra-

23 THE NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., FACTORS AFFECTING
THE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG EXPENDIUREs, ISSUE BRIEF 1 (July 1999),

availableat http://www.nihcm.org/FinalText3.PDF.
24 Katharine Levit et al., Inflation Spurs Health Spending in 2000, HEALTH
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 172, 173-74.
25 THE NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG
EXPENDITURES IN 2000: THE UPWARD TREND CONTINUES 2 (May 2001), available at

www.nihcm.org/spending200l.pdf
[hereinafter NIHCM].
26
Id. at3.
27 Id. at 2-3, 9-10:
28
ld. at2, 10.
29 Id. at 2-3, 10.
30
Id. at 2-3, 11-12.
31 See Bradley C. Strunkn et al., Tracking Health Care Costs: Hospital Care
Surpasses Drugs as the Key Cost Driver, HEALTH AFF., Sept. 26, 2001 (examing
trends in outpatient, inpatient, physician, and prescription drug spending), at http:

1130.94.25.113/readeragent.php?ID=/usr/local/apache/sites/healthaffairs.org/htdocs/
Library/v20n6/s2.pdf.

32 See NIHCM, supra note 25, at 3-4 (stating that in early 2001, twenty-five
States reported that their fiscal year 2002 Medicaid budgets were going to be exceeded, due partly to the increasing amount of money spent on prescription drugs).
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tion approved sixty-two new drugs. 33 Between 1994 and 1998,
149 new drugs were approved.34 The reliance on drug therapies
has grown in line with the increased presence. Alan F. Holmer,
the president of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (PhRMA), recently observed that these increases
show that people believe that prescription medicines are "the
best value in health care today, allowing patients to stay out of
35
the hospital, off the surgery table, on the job and in the home."
The continued advances of research offer more and improved drug therapies. The advantages of drug therapies are increased life spans and better health. This presents a paradox of
the dominant use of drug therapies and interventions. As drug
therapies replace costly surgeries and hospital stays, life spans
increase.37 People live longer and they are susceptible to new
diseases and ailments that require more treatments. Alternatively, the drug treatment may be required for long periods of
time or for life.38 Drug therapies may offer cost effectiveness
over other therapies but may also naturally increase health care
costs. 39 This paradox reflects the difference between two oftenconfused terms: cost effectiveness and cost savings. The former
is a cost-benefit analysis and the latter is a measure of the
amount of money saved.
The pharmacoeconomic benefit of drug interventions, both
cost effectiveness and cost savings of drug therapies as compared to other therapies, is difficult to evaluate. Recent press
reports suggest that for every $1 spent on drugs there is a $3.65
saving on hospital spending.4 0 At the same time, Health Mainte33GLUCK, supra note 12, at 1.
34

Id.

35Robert Pear, Spending on PrescriptionDrugs Increases by Almost 19 Per-

cent: DoctorsAre Using More of Costliest Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, at
Al.
36 Stanton, supra note 17, at 149.
37
See J.D. Kleinke, Just What the HMO Ordered: The Paradoxof Increasing
Drug Costs, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 78, 82.
38 See id. (noting how it can take up to ten years for the cost savings associated with a cholesterol-lowering program to take effect).
39See Peter J. Neumann et al., Are PharmaceuticalsCost-Effective? A Review
of the Evidence, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 92, 92-93 (examining the argument
that money spent on pharmaceuticals can decrease hospital costs, and describing
evidence that limiting the number of prescriptions which the elderly could fill would
subsequently increase hospital costs).
40 Robert Pear, Clinton Will Seek a Medicare Change on Drug Coverage,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 8, 1999, at Al.
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nance Organizations (HMOs) are complaining of increased
pharmaceutical costs for new drugs with no additional bene4
fits. 1

Cost effectiveness is a comparative evaluation; it therefore
offers a way to evaluate one type of intervention with regard to
another. The comparison of the two interventions results in a
cost-benefit analysis, where the benefits would likely be measured as an estimate of life years and/or health status following
each type of intervention. 4lAn example is the comparison of
using anti-viral therapies in patients with herpes zoster virus
infection versus no therapy for the infection. A comparison of
the health care costs incurred in both these situations and the
health status under both these scenarios produces a comparative
value of the costs to43the adjusted benefits for drug therapy versus no intervention.
A cost-effective drug intervention is one that is as effective
as another but at a lesser cost. However, a more useful definition given the complexity of potential benefits, suggested by
Peter J. Neumann and colleagues, includes not only less costly
and as effective therapies, but also therapies that are "more
costly and more effective, as long as society is willing to pay
for the QALYs 44 gained or other health outcomes produced." 45
Cost savings may be complicated to determine as well. A
preventative therapy may have initial cost increases that may be
offset only at a much later time. For example, medicines for
high cholesterol require initial investment which will lead to
reduced high cost care for heart attacks and strokes many years
later. The cost savings of later high cost care may not be realized for many years. While the presence of and reliance on drug
therapy is clear, the additional costs and cost-benefits to this
transformation in medical treatment is less clear.

41 See Kleinke, supra note 37, at 82 (discussing HMO complaints against the
"highlyrofitable" pharmaceutical industry).
There are a number of methods used to evaluate this benefit. Each has inherent limitations. More popular methods include life years added, quality adjusted
life year (QALY), and disability adjusted life year (DALY) measures.
43
See Neumann et al., supra note 39, at 98 exh.3.
44 QALYs stands for quality-adjusted life years. Id. at 94.
45

Id. at 98.
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What is clear though is that prescription drug costs continue to soar in the United States. Prescription drug spending
has been growing disproportionately compared to the rest of the
health sector. 47 Prescription drug spending as a percentage of
health care spending grew from 5.6% in 1993 to 7.9% in 1998.48
In 1999, drug costs rose between 14% and 18% while the rest of
health care spending increased by only 5.3%.49 Drug prices

grew 2.4 times the overall Consumer Price Index, at an annual
rate of 6.1% in 1999.50 This dramatic growth in health care
spending is due to a number of factors including: the prevalence
and volume of prescription drug use;5 1 the development of new
of drugs to the public; 53
and more costly drugs; 52 the marketing
54
and, inflation and price increases.
B. Prescription Drug Use and the Medicare Population
The elderly are particularly impacted by the increased presence of prescription drugs in the health sector. According to a
study by the American Association of Retired Persons, eighty
percent of retired persons take a prescription medication daily.
Although the elderly (sixty-five years old and older) comprise
about twelve percent of the population, they account for a third
of prescription drug spending. 56 The majority of health care
costs are incurred by the elderly population, as are the costs for
46 See Pear, supra note 9 (reporting the more health care dollars are being
spent on prescription drugs).
47See NIHCM, supra note 25, at 3 (noting that drug spending has contributed
disproportionately to increased health insurance premiums and increased health care
costs).
48 GAIL SHEARER, CONSUMERS UNION, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS FOR MEDICARE

BENEFICIARIES: 10 IMPORTANT FACTS 4 (Apr. 2000), http://www.consumer.org/pdf/
meddrugs.pdf.
9 GLucK, supra note 12, at 1.
50
SHEARER, supra note 48, at 4.
51 See NIHCM, supra note 25, at 2-3, 9-10.
52 See id. at 2-3, 10; Michael S. Wilkes et al., Direct-to-ConsumerPrescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact and Implications, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr.
2000, at53110, 112.
See NICHM, supra note 25, at 12-13.
5' See id. at 12.

55 Ways to Make Prescription Drugs More Affordable for Seniors, Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Health, House Ways and Means Committee (Feb. 15,
2000) (statement of Dr. Beatrice Braun, Board of Directors, AARP) [hereinafter
Braun testimony], available at http://www.aarp.org/press/testimony/2000/021500b.
html.
56 Id.
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prescription drugs. The prevalence of prescription drug thera-

pies is particularly evident among Medicare
beneficiaries and
57
has also increased the costs of medical care.
Many Medicare beneficiaries have unreliable, inadequate,
or no drug coverage. 58 Nearly one-third of beneficiaries have
out-of-pocket health care expenditures greater than ten percent
of their income. 59 Besides premium payments, prescription drug
spending is the largest out-of-pocket health care spending
among seniors, and "[o]n average, these beneficiaries spend as
much out-of-pocket for prescription drugs ... as for physician

care, vision services, and medical supplies combined." °
Prescription drug expenses for beneficiaries are quite variable. Further, the payment sources for these expenses are
equally varied. In 1999, outpatient drug spending averaged $942
a year per beneficiary. 61 This was paid almost equally by insurers and out-of-pocket by beneficiaries. 62 However, this average
does not reflect the uneven distribution of spending among
beneficiaries. Many beneficiaries do not spend much on prescription drugs while a smaller group of beneficiaries have large
drug costs. 63 This is better demonstrated in the median cost per
beneficiary of $200, where half of beneficiaries spend less for
out-of-pocket expenditures. 64 One reason for this spread can be

See generally Robert W. Dubois et al., Explaining Drug Spending Trends:
Does PerceptionMatch Reality?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 231, 232 (examining the underlying drivers of drug spending trends).
58 See Bruce Stuart et al., Dynamics in Drug Coverage of Medicare Beneficiaries: Finders,Losers, Switchers, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 86 (discussing
how "Medicare alone offers no protection from the vicissitudes of the market for
outpatient prescription drugs"); Nadereh Pourat et al., Socioeconomic Differences in
Medicare Supplemental Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 186 (reporting
on "[1large income-related disparities" in the type of supplemental insurance).
59GAIL SHEARER, CONSUMERS UNION, HIDDEN FROM VIEW: THE GROWING
BURDEN OF HEALTH CARE COSTS (1998),- http://www.consumersunion.org/health/
0122exec.htm.
6o Braun testimony, supra note 55.
61 GLUCK, supra note 12, at 1 (using data from the 1995 Medicare Current
Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) projected forward to 1999).
62
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 39 (but noting that the amount
of out-of-pocket expenses can vary considerably, from fifty-eight percent for those
who have Medigap coverage to twenty percent for those with Medicaid coverage).
63 GLUCK, supra note 12, at 1 (estimating from 1995 MCBS data prepared by
Actuarial Research Corporation for the National Academy of Social Insurance).
64 id.
57
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directly attributed to differences in spending between benefici65
aries with coverage and beneficiaries without coverage.
Presently, approximately sixty-five percent of Medicare66
beneficiaries have some form of prescription drug coverage.
This is usually in one of four forms: employer-sponsored coverage, Medicaid, Medicare HEMO (Medicare+Choice Plans) or
Medigap policies. 67 Nearly thirty-three percent of Medicare
beneficiaries have supplemental health care insurance through
employer-sponsored policies. 68 This coverage is for both working and retired beneficiaries. 69 Through this supplemental insurance, eighty-six percent have a prescription benefit (twentyeight percent of total beneficiaries). 70 The benefits offered for
prescription drug coverage through this employer-provided insurance are often the most comprehensive outpatient drug coverage benefits available, offering lower deductibles than other
sources. 7 1 This type of coverage has been declining, both in
terms of numbers of beneficiaries covered and the level of benefits. 72 The decline is attributable to fewer employers offering
continued supplemental insurance for their retirees, and to the
use of managed care plans that limit drug benefits.73 A Medicare
prescription drug coverage policy might further threaten the use
of these plans as employers opt against offering supplemental
insurance because it is available through Medicare.

65 See John A. Poisal & Lauren Murray, Growing Differences Between Medicare Beneficiaries With and Without Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 74,
74.
66 GLUCK, supra note 12, at 3 tbl.2; see also REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 8, at 9 (finding that in 1996, sixty-nine percent of Medicare beneficiaries had
drug coverage for at least one month during the year but only fifty-three had coverage
for the entire year).
67
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 11.
68 See id.
69 See GLUCK, supra note 12, at 4.
70 Id. at 3. tbl.2.
7' Id. at3.
72 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 13 (citing recent employer
surveys showing a decrease in providing health benefits to retirees and Medicare
eligible retirees); HEwrrr ASSOCIATES, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, RETIREE HEALTH COVERAGE: RECENT TRENDS AND EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES ON FUTURE
BENEFITS 3 (Oct. 1999) (noting that some employers have dropped coverage from
employer-sponsored health plans for retirees altogether, and fewer new employers are
adding such coverage), available at http://www.kff.org/content/1999/1540/Retiree.
pdf
73 See GLUCK, supra note 12, at 4 & tbl.3.
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Beneficiaries with low incomes may be eligible for Medicaid coverage of prescription drugs. 74 Approximately twelve
75
percent of Medicare beneficiaries

are Medicaid eligible.

Ninety-one percent of those eligible for Medicaid receive their
prescription drug coverage through Medicaid.7 6 This represents

eleven percent of all beneficiaries. 77 Medicaid covers most prescription drug costs (depending on the state plan and involvement of HMOs). 78 However, between 1990 and 1999, Medicaid
spending on prescription drugs more than tripled.7 9

Some Medicare+Choice plans, the Medicare HMO alternative, have been able to offer a prescription drug coverage benefit.80 This is likely to change due to limits in payments from the
federal government to Medicare+Choice plans. 81 Most plans
offer the drug coverage now, and nearly all Medicare beneficiaries covered 82
by these plans have prescription drug coverage
cuts by
through them. However, recent news suggests drastic 83
HMOs in their drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries.

74 See id. at 2. This discussion includes "Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries"
(QMBs) or "Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiaries" (SLMBs). QMBs are
low-income Medicare beneficiaries who receive assistance with Medicare costsharing and Part B premiums but are not covered for prescription medications.
SLMBs are low-income beneficiaries who receive assistance with Part B premiums
only.
75 See Margaret Davis et al., PrescriptionDrug Coverage, Utilization, and
Spending Among Medicare Beneficiaries, HEALTH AFF., Jan-Feb. 1999, at 231, 235
exh.1 (citing 1995 data on the distribution of noninstitutional Medicare beneficiaries
by type of supplemental insurance and presence of drug coverage).
76
d .at 237 exh.2 (citing 1995 data on the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries using prescription drugs by the type of supplementary insurance coverage and
presence of drug coverage).
77
See id. at 235 exh.1.
78
See GLUCK, supra note 12, at 2-3.
79
NIHCM, supra note 25, at 4.
80
See Stephen B. Soumerai & Dennis Ross-Degnan, InadequatePrescriptionDrug Coveragefor Medicare Enrollees-A Call to Action, 340 NEv ENG. J. MED.
722, 724-25 & tbl.1 (1999) (noting, however, that the state programs vary considerably in their income requirements, the kinds of drugs covered, and the sources of program funding).
81 See GLUCK, supra note 12, at 3.
82
See Davis et al., supra note 75, at 231 (stating that 65% of Medicare beneficiaries have at least some prescription drug coverage, and that 95% of Medicare
health maintenance organization enrollees have drug coverage).
83 See Milt Freudenheim, Many H.M.O.'s For the Elderly Cut or Abolish
Drug Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at Cl (reporting that some insurers are
either eliminating drug coverage or are requiring higher payments from plan members).

460
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Under federal law, there are ten Medigap policies available
for supplemental insurance for Medicare enrollees. Only three
of these plans offer prescription drug coverage, and offer it in
limited form. The Medigap Plans H, I, and J offer this coverage,
but the premiums for these plans are double that of some of the
other Medigap plans. 84 This difference in premium levels is attributable to the prescription drug coverage benefit. 85 Moreover,
the coverage for drug prescriptions in these plans is also very
limited.86 There is a $250 deductible and the plans only pay half
of the costs up to either $1,250 or $3,000, depending on the
plan.87 Medigap premiums also increase with age.88 The coverage is more expensive as enrollees become increasingly likely
to be sick, and as they have less income. Almost thirty percent
of Medicare enrollees are covered under a Medigap supplemental insurance policy. 89 Of these, only twenty-nine percent have
prescription drug coverage, which represents only eight percent
of all enrollees. 90 Finally, eight percent of Medicare beneficiaries have no supplemental insurance at all. 91

84 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., 2001 GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE: CHOOSING A MEDIGAP POLICY TO SUPPLEMENT THE ORIGINAL MEDICARE PLAN

54 (2001) (discussing the basics of these plans), available at http://www.medicare.
gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/lpguide.pdf.
85 GLUCK, supra note 12, at 4.
86 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 15 (noting that some carriers do not offer drug coverage, and those that do may not cover if the applicant is
"high-risk"; also commenting that there are limited enrollment periods, as well as
some practices known as attained-age rating).
8

See id. at 14.

Thomas Rice et al., The Impact of Policy Standardizationon the Medigap
Market, 34 INQUIRY 106, 113 (1997) (noting that the practice of raising premiums as
beneficiaries get older is called "attained-age" rating).
89 See Davis et al., supra note 75, at 237 exh. 2 (reporting 1995 data, where
70% of all persons had no supplemental drug coverage-having FFS Medicare only).
88

90 AARP, OUT-OF-POCKET SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE BY MEDICARE BENEFI-

CIARIES AGE 65 AND OLDER: 1999 PROJECTIONS, ISSUE BRIEF # 41, at 3 fig.3 (Dec.
1999).
91 Id. at4.
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Table 1. Prescription Drug Coverage Description for Medicare
Beneficiaries, 1995.92
Type of
Coverage

Percent of Beneficiaries with Specified
Type of Coverage

Percent with
Prescription
Drug Coverage

Percent of All
Beneficiaries with
Drug Coverage

Employer
Sponsored

33%

86%

28%

Medicaid

12

90

7

Medicare
Risk HMO

7

95

8

MediGap

29

29

3

Other Forms

11

89

6

No Insurance

8

0

0

Total

100

65

Medicare beneficiaries who lack a prescription drug benefit
pay more for prescription medications than those who have
coverage. 93 They lack access to the savings available to insurers
and government purchasers, who have greater negotiating
strength because of purchasing power. 94 In 1996, average outof-pocket expenditures for prescription drugs for those without
coverage was $463 as compared to $253 for those who had coverage. 95 Findings of the House of Representatives Committee on
Government Reform described price discrimination for seniors.
Seniors without coverage were shown to be paying more than
twice the price that insurance companies96 and government buyers were paying for needed medications.
Although Medicare beneficiaries without prescription drug
coverage pay more for prescriptions, this lack of coverage creates the larger problem of decreased use of needed medications
by those without the prescription coverage. 97 One study found
that Medicare beneficiaries who did not have drug coverage got
fewer medications and had spent less on prescription medica92 This table is adapted from GLUCK, supra note 12, at 3 tbl.2.
93 See John A. Poisal & George S. Chulis, Medicare Beneficiariesand Drug
Coverage, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 248.
94 Richard G. Frank; PrescriptionDrug Prices:Why Do Some Pay More Than
Others Do?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 115, 121-22.
95

Poisal & Chulis, supra note 93.
SHEARER, supra note 48, at 3.
97
1d. at 6.
96
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tions presumably because they could not afford them. 98 Another

study found that small price increases in the out-of-pocket cost
for hypertension medicine resulted in fewer purchases of that
drug.

The need for a prescription drug benefit among the Medicare population is exacerbated by two factors. The first is the
growth of the Medicare population due to the baby-boomers
entering this group. 1°° The second is the decline in employersponsored supplemental insurance. 10 1 Absent a change in drug
benefits, the combination of these factors will lead to an increased number of Medicare beneficiaries without prescription
drug coverage in the coming years.
C. Previous Government Efforts and Recent Private Measures to

Assist the Elderly with Prescription Costs
While the need for a prescription drug benefit for the elderly is increasing, this is not a new issue. Previous efforts at
providing a Medicare prescription drug benefit have failed
largely due to political pressures.1 0 2 In 1988, Congress expanded Medicare coverage for catastrophic expenses under the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA). °3 This
law mainly expanded inpatient coverage but it also provided for
prescription drug coverage. 1°4 This was enacted during the
1980s when fiscal conservatism had refocused efforts on controlling government spending and the Act "highlights the connection between Medicare's interest group politics and the new
98See Poisal & Chulis, supra note 93, at 248, 251-252, exh.2 (indicated that
those without drug coverage averaged 16.01 prescriptions and spent $463 on those
prescriptions annually, while those with drug coverage averaged 21.14 prescriptions
and spent $769 on those annually).
99 See Jan Blustein, Drug Coverage and Drug Purchasesby MedicareBeneficiarieswith Hypertension, Health Aff., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 219.
1oo
See Victor R. Fuchs, Health Carefor the Elderly: How Much? Who Will
Payfor It?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 11, 11 (citing a one percent more rapid
growth in elderly population than the rest of the population as one reason for the
increase in the cost of health expenditures for the elderly).
101 See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 8, at 13 (discussing drops in

coverage and distinguishing between active workers versus retirees).
102
MARMoR, supra note 10, at 110.
103 Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683. This law was enacted in June 1988,
became effective on January 1, 1989, and was terminated on November 30, 1989 by
the Medicare Catastrophic Repeal Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-234, 103 Stat. 1979.
'04 See Pub. L. No. 100-360, sec. 202, 102 Stat. 683, 702.
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politics of deficit reduction." 10 5 The new Act was to be financed
10 6
by increases in premiums paid by Medicare beneficiaries.
This upset some beneficiaries, particularly wealthier enrollees
who had drug coverage but did not want to pay higher Medicare
premiums. 10 7 The MCCA was overturned the next year, leaving
Congress10 8frustrated from the experience of major Medicare legislation.
The election of President Clinton in 1993 led to serious
consideration of health care reform, including Medicare reform. 10 9 As part of his health care plan President Clinton intended to provide a prescription drug benefit to Medicare beneficiaries, mostly in the hopes of gaining support for his program
from the elderly." 0 The Clinton health care plan did not get
passed due to its complexity and resulting political problems.' 1 '
The Republican-held Congress in 1995 made a similar effort at
larger scale health care reform. This largely consisted of a plan
to move Medicare to the use of vouchers for purchasing health
care needs. Although President Clinton vetoed this measure at
the time, it set the stage for two years of partisan disagreement
between Congress and the White House that eventually ended in
the passage of the Balanced Budget
1 12Act of 1997, which included some large Medicare changes.
In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act introduced more private
sector market measures into the Medicare system, including allowing beneficiaries to enroll in private plans, but it also included greater government control over reimbursement amounts
and increased charges to beneficiaries. Further, the 1997 Balanced Budget Act created a group to study Medicare called the
National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare
(NBCFM). Senator John Breaux (D-La.) and Congressman Bill
Thomas (R-Cal.) led this commission of seventeen members.
The NBCFM worked for eighteen months to make recommendations on Medicare reform. These recommendations largely
105 MARMOR,

supra note 10, at 110.

'06 Pub. L. No. 100-360,
107MARMOR, supra note

sec. 103, 211, 102 Stat. 683, 687.

10, at 111.

108Id.

'ioId.at 126-132.
10 Id. at 134.
111 See generally John K. Iglehart, Medicare and PrescriptionDrugs, 344
NEw ENG. J. MaD. 1010 (2001) (noting how the Clinton proposal failed in 1994 and
discussing the greater potential for coverage in the current political landscape).
" Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
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suggested the introduction of market reforms into the Medicare
structure. These were very similar to a voucher system earlier
proposed by the Republican Congress. However, the recommendations required a supermajority approval of the committee,
which was never gained. Following the dissolution of the
NBCFM without official recommendation, both Breaux and
Thomas worked to modify plans to introduce in their respective
Houses. 1 3 The Clinton administration and many liberal Democrats who were largely opposed to the Breaux-Thomas plan, offered alternative plans.' In part because of the differences in
approach, no proposals were enacted and there remained no prescription drug benefit for Medicare. However, the problem of a
lack of or inadequate prescription drug coverage among the elderly remains.
Many pharmaceutical companies offer reduced pricing or
free prescription coverage to low-income persons. n 5 Recently,
Pfizer Inc., the largest drug company in the world, implemented
one of the more major of these assistance programs, the Pfizer
Share Card. Pfizer will offer low-income seniors Pfizer pre-6
scriptions for a flat rate of $15 per month per prescription."
This follows in a line of similar actions by other pharmaceutical
companies such as GlaxoSmithKline and Novartis A.G., offering reduced rates for low-income U.S. seniors. 117 The Pfizer
discount, at seventy-five percent savings to seniors is a much
larger discount." 8 Further, the program may assist as many as
seven million Medicare recipients.1 19 While this can clearly be
viewed as a political move, intended to improve the image of
the pharmaceutical industry and soften congressional activity
when it revisits Medicare prescription drug coverage in the up1

See

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE

STUDY PANEL ON MEDICARE'S LONG TERM FINANCING -

FINANCING MEDICARE'S

FUTURE ch.2 (Marilyn Moon & Michael E. Gluck eds., 2000), available at http:II
www.nasi.org/usr doc/m_.report-financingNO.pdf.
114See id.

115See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of American, PhRMA,

Directory of PrescriptionDrug PatientAssistance Programs2002 (listing forty-eight
pharmaceutical companies which offered various drug assistance programs), at
http:llwww.phrma.orglsearchcures/dpdpap/*
116Robert Pear & Melody Petersen, Pfizer Plans to Offer Prescriptionsto
Elderlyfor a Monthly $15 Fee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at Cl.
11 id.
11 id.
119Id.
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coming election session, the program does provide seniors with
some access to needed medications.
Over the last thirty years, drug therapy and treatment have
dramatically gained importance in health care. This importance
is revealed in the prevalence of use and effectiveness as well as
the economic impact on the health care sector. There has been a
disproportionate impact on the elderly, particularly the Medicare population. The lack of a prescription drug benefit in
Medicare coverage causes large out-of-pocket expenses for this
population, and also compromises the health care of those most
in need of many drug therapies.

STATE PROGRAMS FOR ELDERLY ACCESS TO
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE
In response to the growing need for prescription drug coverage for the elderly and the lack of a federal measure to address this need, States are experimenting with various programs
to offer aid to seniors for prescription medicines.120 Presently,
twenty-six states have implemented some form of prescription
drug assistance for the elderly and many States are considering
options for assistance. 121 (See Table 1.) While state programs
demonstrate a number of potential methods of providing aid for
prescription medicines, they also reinforce the need for a federal
response in part because of the legal challenges to the state programs.
Although there are a number of proposals for adding a drug
benefit to the Medicare program, recent political and economic
122
developments have slowed congressional action and interest.
120

See Pear, supra note 9 (reporting that twenty-six states have authorized a

pharmaceutical
assistance program).
121
See SENIOR LIVING, PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION

COST COVERAGE BY STATE

(n.d.) (listing various programs and their eligibility requirements), at http:llsenior
living.about.com/library/weekly/aa092500b.htm?terms=%22prescription+Medication
+cost+coverage+by+state%22 (last visited Jan. 24, 2002); HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., STATE HEALTH FACTS ONLINE: SENIOR PHARMACEUTICAL ASSISTANCE PRO-

GRAMS, 2000
(same) [hereinafter STATE HEALTH FACTS ONLINE].
22

1 See generallyRobin Toner, CongressionalBudget Battle Centers on Older
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at Al (stating that the 2002 Congressional
elections "will play out amid the increasing strains of an aging society, a sluggish
economy, a resurgence in health care costs and a disappearing budget surplus");

Robert Pear, Bipartisan Medicare Panel to Call for More Spending: Pressure on
Congress to Reject Bush's Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at A10 (noting reasons
why the White House wants to slow the growth of Medicare); Jackie Koszczuk, Efforts to Subsidize PrescriptionCosts for Elderly May be Resuscitated, KNIGHT RID-
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These developments include the recently passed tax-cut, 123 new
estimates for the cost of adding a program, 124 differences about
whether to cover all beneficiaries or only low-income beneficiaries, 125 and President Bush's Interim Immediate Helping Hand
proposal to encourage state actions. 126 Further, it appears that
spending on prescription drugs will continue to increase causing
further demand for coverage. It is estimated that from the years
1998 to 2000, there was a forty percent increase in drug spending.' 27 Over the last year, prescription drug spending increased
18.8%.128 States feel the impact of these demands more immediately, as they cause increased pressure on Medicaid programs
and on efforts to secure the health of their citizens.
The States are taking a cue from the Bush Administration's
Immediate Helping Hand Proposal. The Bush Administration
offers a two-stage proposal for Medicare Reform. 29 The first
stage is the early initiative for providing low-income Medicare
beneficiaries with coverage by offering direct aid to the States
that participate in providing assistance. Under this plan, there
would be a total of $48 billion provided to the States over four
years.1 30 The second part of Bush's Medicare reform plan is
based on the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program and
recommendations of the NBCFM. Although this plan for estabDERITRIBUNE Bus. NEws, Jan. 24, 2002 (discussing House Speaker Dennis Hastert's

prescription drug plan proposal).
23 See Koszczuk, supra note 122 (discussing the cut in the context of the
Congressional Budget Office's fiscal projection of a budget deficit).
124 Robert Pear, CBO Issues New Estimatesfor Medicare PrescriptionDrugs,
N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 2001.
12 See Anjetta McQueen, Associated Press, Lawmakers ConsiderMedicare
Reform Plans (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://archive.nandotimes.comnoframes/
story/0,2107,500310200-500498649-503508602-0,00.htil.
126See WHITE HOUSE, A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW BEGINNINGS, DEPARTMENT OF
21, HIGHLIGHTS OF 2002 FUNDING, at http:llwww.

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVIcES, #

whitehouse.gov/news/usbudget/blueprint/bud2l.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002)
(outlining the basics of the Immediate Helping Hand Program); see also AM. FED'N
OF STATE, COUNTY AND MuN. EMPLOYEES, SUMMARY OF PROPOSED BUSH TAx AND
SPENDING PLAN § 3 (describing the program as providing stated with federal funds to

establish new pharmaceutical assistance programs) [hereinafter AFSCME], http:ll
www.afscme.orglaction/bushtax.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
127Pear, supra note 35.
128id.

129The text of President Bush's announcement of Medicare Reform proposals
is available at NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Medicare Overhaul (July 12, 2001), http://

pbs.org/newshour/healtlprescriptions/bush_7-12.html.
130 AFSCM, supra note 126, § 3.
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lishing a benefit modeled from the recommendations of the
NBCFM was endorsed by Tommy Thompson, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, it is opposed by two high-power
Republicans, Bill Thomas (R-Cal.) who chairs the House Ways
and Means Committee and Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa)
who chairs the Senate Finance Committee. Both favor Medicare
inclusion 13of1 a prescription drug benefit over expanding state
coverage.
The range of state actions to protect seniors from the high
costs of prescription drug use is very broad. In general, States
are using one of two methods, either a form of subsidy for prescription medications or state-mandated discounts for prescription drugs to seniors. 132 The subsidies can come in the form of
direct payments for part of each prescription, as in Pennsylvania. 133 There are similar programs in Illinois, New York, and
New Jersey.13 4 In the last year, New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts have doubled the size of their programs by expanding
enrollment eligibility. 135 All of the subsidy programs by the
States are income-based, so they do not offer broad coverage of
Medicare beneficiaries. 36 Michigan and Missouri use a tax rebate to subsidize the cost of prescriptions. 37 These provide a
model for the use of tax-rebate measures in federal proposals.
Nevada, under its Senior Rx program, is using subsidies to allow seniors to purchase private insurance from Fidelity Security
Life Insurance. 138 This insurance provides drug benefits.139 A
number of States are using money received from the tobacco
131 See Iglehart, supra note 111, at 1012-13 (stating that both oppose statebased pharmacy
assistance programs).
32
1 See Pear, supranote 9.

113 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 3761-509 (West Supp. 2002).
13 See 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25/4(f) (West 2001); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 118E, § 16B (West Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-45; N.Y. EXEC.
LAW §§ 547a-547m (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2001).
135Pear, supra note 9.
136See id.

137See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
STAT.

§ 38135.095 (West 2000).

§ 550.2003 (West Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN.

' See NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.665(1) (Michie 2000), amended by 2001
Nev. Stat. 529; see also Nevada Senior Rx Program, Medicinesfor a Healthy Nevada
(2002) (discussing program funding under the Fidelity/Professional Risk and Assessment Management Insurance Services (PRAM)), at http://nevadaseniorrx.comL.
139See generally Nevada Senior Rx Program, supra note 138 (indicating that
the Nevada Department of Human Services determined the most frequently prescribed drugs in order to target the program).
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company 14settlements
to pay for drug benefits in the form of
0
subsidies.

State discounts for prescription drug purchases also come
in a variety of forms. California and Florida have passed laws
141
limiting the amount pharmacies can charge elderly customers.
In California, any Medicare card carrier can show the card to a
pharmacy and pay the amount that the Medicaid program pays
for the drugs. 14 This results in an average saving of twenty-four
percent for prescriptions. 143 States like Washington, West Vir-

ginia, Iowa, and New Hampshire have started collective bargaining groups for aiding low-income elderly. 144 These States
have created purchasing cooperatives to negotiate for drug discounts. 145 This idea is being followed and expanded by States

that are considering146ways to create interstate negotiating blocks
for drug discounts.
Perhaps the most controversial of the state programs are the

ones implemented by Maine and Vermont. These States have
recently gained permission to expand their Medicaid program
coverage to assist with the prescription drug costs of individuals
who do not currently qualify for Medicaid in the state. 147 Pharmaceutical manufacturers have challenged these programs for
their impact on interstate commerce, violation of the Supremacy
Clause, and violation of the Medicaid Act. The challenges are
140 See e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 4-12-8-2 (West 2002); N. Y. PuB. HEALTH
LAW § 2807-v(l)(n) (McKinney 2002).
141 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 130401-130404 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2002);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.9066 (West Supp. 2001).
142 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130404 (West 1996 & Supp. 2002).
143Pear, supra note 9.
144 See id. However, Washington's AWARDS program was invalidated by a
Superior Court ruling on May 5, 2001. This program was started by Governor Gary
Locke. Similar proposals are being put forward in the Washington State Congress.
The New Hampshire program was scheduled to end January 1, 2002. Iowa's program
is not fI1x a state program as it is a demonstration project using federal funds.
SPear, supra note 9.
146 Id.
147 See 1999 Me. Laws 786, § A-3 (stating that the goal of the legislation is
"to make prescription drugs more affordable for qualified Maine residents, thereby
increasing the overall health of Maine residents, promoting healthy communities and
protecting the public health and welfare"); see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
2681 (West Supp. 2001) (outlining the Maine Rx Program); Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. of Am. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001) (describing Vermont's application to the Dept. of Health and Human Services for expansion of their
prescription drug pilot program), rev'd, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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creating complicated and potentially divisive law in the Federal
Circuit courts as well as generating a multitude of differing
state regulations with regard to prescription drug coverage and
expenses for state citizens.
On May 11, 2000, Maine enacted an Act to Establish Fairer
Pricing for Prescription Drugs (Maine Rx Program). 48 This
program was established to allow state residents who were not
Medicaid eligible to purchase prescription drugs from participating pharmacies at discounted prices. 149 The premise of the
legislation was that large purchasers of prescription medications, such as Health Maintenance Organizations, insurance
companies, and the Medicaid program, were able to negotiate
less costly prices for medications through volume purchasing.
Citizens not covered by these groups paid significantly more
(eight-six percent) for their prescription medications.1 ° The
statute required pharmaceutical manufacturers to rebate a portion of the price for providing these drugs in order to participate
in the State Medicaid program. 151 The plan required manufacturers to provide the State with a negotiated rebate on the sale
of drugs by pharmacists to uninsured persons. One penalty for
manufacturers who were unwilling to participate was having
their drugs placed on a prior authorization list for Medicaid participants. 152 The law also defined "illegal profiteering" as manufacturers requiring an "unconscionable price", or prices or terms
that lead to any "unjust or unreasonable profit" or actions which
"intentionally prevent[], limit[], lessen[] or restrict[] the sale or
distribution of prescription drugs in this State in retaliation for
the provisions" of the statute. 153 Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), an association representing drug manufacturers, challenged the Maine Rx Program in
the United States District Court of Maine.154 This group represented about seventy-five percent of brand name drug sales in
the United States. All of the manufacturers represented by
148 Mn. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (West Supp. 2001).
149Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'n, Maine Dep't of Human

Servs., 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363 at *2.
50
Id. at *2 n.2.

151ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(3)-(4) (West Supp. 2001); see also
1999 Me.52Laws 786, § A-3.
1 See 1999 Me. Laws 786, § A-3.
153Id.

154 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. ofAm., 2000 U.S. Dist. LXIS 17363.
155 Id. at *4.
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PhRMA were located outside of the Maine.156 PhRMA challenged three aspects of the program: (1) the prohibition on excessive pricing by drug manufacturers, (2) the prohibition
against manufacturers changing their distribution schemes to
avoid Maine's law, and (3) the requirement that manufacturers
pay a rebate when uninsured citizens purchased prescription
drugs. 157 The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine held
that the Maine Rx Program violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause with regard to the illegal profiteering regulations because the extraterritorial effects of the statute were to regulate
commerce that occurred completely outside the State boundaries.1 58 The court also held that the penalty for not participating
in the rebate program, the prior authorization of those drugs for
Medicaid participants, violated the Supremacy Clause. 159 The
court found this type of prior authorization was not authorized
by the Medicaid Act and therefore was prevented by preemption
by federal law. 60 The court granted a preliminary injunction,
preventing Maine from implementing these sections of the
Maine Rx Program, stating that the "plaintiff's likelihood of
success on the merits
of most of its constitutional challenges to
16 1
be overwhelming."'
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, Maine challenged the injunction as to whether the
program violated the Federal Medicaid program and whether
the extraterritorial reach of the regulation as to the sale of drugs
by out-of-state pharmaceutical manufacturers to out-of-state
distributors violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 162 The
Court of Appeals found that the prior authorization requirement
was consistent with the Medicaid Program, specifically the
Medicaid regulation permitting prior authorization, which says
States may 'subject to prior authorization any covered outpatient drug.' 1 63 However, the court concluded that its opinion did
not prejudice PhRMA's right to re-challenge Medicaid preemption after program was implemented, if Medicaid recipients
156Id.at *5.
157
Id. at *3.
158
Id. *6-7.
159 Id. at *20.

160
Id.at *19.

161Id. at *24.
162Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, (1st Cir.

2001), cert granted,No. 01-188, 2002 WL 1393606 (U.S. June 28, 2002).
163
Id.at 75 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V. 1999).
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were harmed by the prior authorization requirement. 64 Secondly, the Court of Appeals found that the Maine Rx Program
did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. In evaluating
which level of review to apply to the state regulation, the court
found that the regulation was not per se invalid nor was it subject to strict scrutiny review for regulating with discriminatory
purpose, but instead should be evaluated under low level scrutiny as the statute regulated evenhandedly
with only incidental
165
effects on interstate commerce.
The court's rationale for choosing the level of review deserves some consideration as that selection dramatically alters
the outcome of this type of challenge. The court found that the
regulation was not per se invalid because the regulation did "not
interfere with regulatory schemes in other states."'166 The regulation was only on activity that occurred in the state such as purchase of the prescription medications that led to the rebate, rebate price negotiations, and the penalties the State imposed for
not participating. 167 However the court pointed out that one consideration in this analysis would be the impact of other States
enacting similar legislation. 68 The court stated that the "most
apparent effect of similar statutes being passed in other states
would be a loss in profits for manufacturers" which might lead
1 69
to "inconsistent obligations" or price-linking between states.
The court also dismissed the strict scrutiny test because the
regulation was not discriminatory on its face or in its effects.
While this court found these activities to be predominately
within the State, other courts may interpret differently the fact
that all the manufacturers and almost all of the distributors were
located outside of the state. Finally, in the balancing test of interests, the court found that Maine's stated purpose to protect its
citizens' ability to purchase prescription medications outweighed the incidental effect on commerce.170 As the Court of
Appeals concludes, this is a "close case,"
but the value of State
71
experimentation should be preserved.

'6'

Id. at78.

165 Id. at 80-85.

'M Id. at 82.
167Id.
68

1 Id.
169
Id. at 82-83.
17 0
Id.at 84.
171 Id. at 85.
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PhRMA also challenged Vermont's Medicaid expansion
plan to assist with the costs of prescription medications. In this
challenge though, PhRMA challenged the federal government's
approval of a State Medicaid waiver. 172 PhRMA filed suit
against the Department of Health and Human Services and
Vermont intervened. Vermont's Pharmacy Discount Program
(PDP) is a prescription drug subsidy program, which is an expansion of the pilot Medicaid project known as the Vermont
Health Access Plan (VHAP). 7 3 Vermont applied for a Medicaid

waiver from the federal government to expand the pilot project
to provide coverage for 70,000 Vermont residents who do not
have prescription drug coverage.174 Under this program, Vermont pharmacies charge eligible beneficiaries the Medicaid discounted prices for prescriptions. 175 The beneficiaries are expected to pay 82.5% of the Medicaid discounted price and then
the state would initially pay the remaining 17.5%.176 However,
the state would later bill the manufacturers for this 17.5%.177
The manufacturers claim that this violates the Medicaid statute
because it imposes more than nominal co-payments on beneficiaries and because the State does not provide medical assistance
because no payment is made under the state plan. 178 The court
held that PhRMA lacked standing for the co-payment challenge. 179 It also held that the Secretary, in approving the expanded plan recognized the State's initial payments as payments
for medical care within the meaning of the statute.' The Court
denied the injunction to suspend the waiver. However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the State was not making payments within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 and therefore the Secretary did not have
authority to grant the Medicaid waiver.18 1 The court held that
only Congress had the authority to permit States to require a
172See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1,
(D.D.C. 2001) rev'd, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219,
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
173 Id. at 5.
174 Id.

175 Id.
176Id. at6.
17id.
178Id. at 9.
179 Id. at 10.
"0 Id. at 13-15.

181Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F. 3d 219 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
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rebate where the State did not itself make payment. 8 2 This
again highlights the need for a federal response. The court reversed the decision and remanded for further proceedings.
These decisions reflect the variety of challenges that pharmaceutical manufacturers make to state plans to expand coverage of Medicaid plans to assist citizens with prescription drug
costs. The Maine decision also reflects the potential for alternative holdings on similar fact patterns based on interpretation by
other Circuit courts. Further, pharmaceutical manufacturers are
not the only affected groups that may challenge state plans. In
Wal-Mart Stores v. Knickrehm,i8 3 Wal-Mart challenged an Arkansas reimbursement formula, which established a two-tiered
reimbursement system for prescription drug-costs. While the
State was not attempting to expand its Medicaid coverage, it
was attempting to control costs by charging different prices to
chain pharmacies and independent pharmacies.18 4 The court
found the system violated the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause. 185 This demonstrates another way that States
might be limited in the manner in which they are able to offer
prescription drug cost assistance.
As the varieties of state programs suggest, there are a number of methods being used by the States to address the needs of
the elderly for drug coverage. Although this permits experimentation in approaches, the variety highlights the need for federal
action. The wide array of state programs is burdensome not only
for drug manufacturers, wholesalers, and distributors but also
for the elderly. The programs vary in who may be covered, and
in the amount of coverage provided under the particular state
program. (See Table 2). This leads to uneven benefits in different States. It may also cause seniors to migrate to States with
the most coverage. This creates a large burden on States with a
high demand on their programs. State negotiations and collective state negotiations with drug companies may lead to regional
lockouts of certain types of drugs. Further, the drug companies
may be forced into price discrimination based on regions or
power of the bargaining groups.

18 2 Id. at 226.
183 101 F. Supp. 2d 749 (E.D. Ark. 2000).
'84 Id. at 750.
185Id.

at 764.
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Although President Bush would like to utilize state programs in covering prescription drug expenses, especially in
light of the restrictions that the recent tax-cut places on the possibility of federal action on expanding Medicare, 18 6 the labora-

tory of state action may be more harmful than helpful. President
Bush has offered the states $48 billion dollars over the next four
years to aid seniors, including the provision of some drug benefits. 187 Given the recent spikes in drug spending, the costs to the
States to provide this coverage will be very high. 188 As Ray
Scheppach, executive director of the National Governors Association, stated to a Senate committee hearing on Medicare, the

States have shouldered much of the burden of providing prescription drug coverage to the elderly. 189 He concluded 19that
if a
a federal benefit. 0

universal benefit is created, it must be

Table 2. State Prescription Drug Programs and Elderly Assistance, 2001.191
State

Pharm. Assistance
Available?

AL

No

AK

No

AZ

No

AR

No

CA

Prescription Drug
Discount Program
for Medicare Recipients

CO

No

Type

Discount

Eligibility

Enrollment

Discount price for
65+/disabled and
a processing fee
for Medicare
cardholders

186 See Bush Tax Cut "Will Halt Medicare Rx Benefit," MARKETLETrER

(Marketletter Publications, London, Eng.), Mar. 19, 2001 (arguing that President
Bush's tax cut will prevent Congress from passing "a meaningful Medicare seniors'
prescription
drug benefit") [hereinafter Bush Tax Cut].
187 AFSCME, supra note 126, § 3.
188 See Pear, supra note 35.
189Finding the Right Fit: Medicare, PrescriptionDrugs, and Current Coverage Options: Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm. (Mar. 4, 2001) (statement of
Ray Scheppach, Executive Director, National. Governors Association), http://www.
nga.orglnga/legislativeUpdate/testimonyDetailPrint/l,1419,1949,00.html.
190 Id.
191 This table has been adapted from STATE HEALTH FACTS ONLINE, supra
note 121.
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CT

Connecticut Pharmaceutical Assistance Contract to
the Elderly and
Disabled Program
(ConnPACE)

Subsidy

Assistance for
65+/disabled with
incomes below
$15,000 individual/18,100 couple. Co-pay-$12.
Annual-$25. Additional assistance
avail.

31,666

DE

1. Nemours Health
Clinic Pharmaceutical Assistance
Program (Private)

1.Discount
2. Subsidy

1. Nemours- Discount for
65+/disabled with
incomes below

1. Nemours
26,000

$12,500 individuai/17,125 coupie. Co-pay-20%

3,577

2. Delaware Prescription Assistance Program
(DPAP) (Public)

DC

No

FL

1.Pharmaceutical
Expense Assistance for Low Income Elderly Individuals Program
2. Medicare Prescription Discount
Program

2. DPAP- Assistance for 65+/
disabled with
incomes between
$12,500-16, 488
individual/17,125-22,128
couple. Co-pay$5 or 25%
1.Subsidy
2.Discount

1. Assistance for
65+/disabled with
incomes between
$7,517-10,222
individual; Medicaid/Medicare
eligible. Co-pay10%. Monthly
limit
2. Discount for
Medicare eligible.
Dispensing fee

GA

No

HI

No

ID

No

2. DPAP

1. Not operational as
of 12/31/01
2. NA
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Illinois Circuit
Breaker and Pharmaceutical Assistance Program

IN

HoosierRx

IA

No1

KS

Senior Pharmacy
Assistance Program

KY

No

LA

No

ME

1.Maine Low Cost
Drug for the Elderly or Disabled
Program

2

2. Maine Rx Program

[Vol. 12:449

Assistance for
65+/ disabled
with incomes
below $21,218
individual/35,740
couple. Co-payincome based.
Annual-$5-25.
Cap-$2,000/yr.
then 20% co-pay

53,555

Refund assistance
for 65+ with incomes below
$11,280 individual/15,192 couple

6, 401 COT

Subsidy

Assistance for
67+ with incomes
below $12,885.
Co-pay-30%.
Annual limit

Not operational as of
12/31/01

1.Subsidy
2.Discount

1. Assistance for
62+/19+disabled
with incomes
below $15,358

1.41,000
2. Not operational as
of 12/31/01

Subsidy

Subsidy

(Discount)

individual/20,460
couple. Co-pay$2-20%
2. Discount for
any senior or
other who lacks
drug coverage.

192 Received a 1 million federal demonstration grant to establish a prescription

drug purchasing cooperative, however this is federally funded cooperative.
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1. Maryland Pharmacy Assistance
Program (MPAP)

1.Subsidy
2. Subsidy

2. Short term Subsidy Plan

1. Assistance for
all non-Medicaid
with incomes
below $9,650
individual /
10,450 couple.
Co-pay

1.34,000
2. Not operational as
of 12/31/01

2. Medicare+Choice supplement enrollees.
Co-pay. Limited
enrollment to
15,000. Annual
limits
Pharmacy Program
(and former Pharmacy Plus Program) with Catastrophic Prescription Drug Insurance Program

Subsidy

Assistance for
65+ with incomes
below $15,492
individual /
20,769 couple.
Co-pays based on
drug. Annual fee
and limits.
Catastrophic
protection enacted
to limit out-ofpocket to
$2000/year or
10% of income.

69,170
(CPDI not
operational
as of
12/31/01)

1. Michigan Emergency Pharmaceutical Program for
Seniors (MEPPS)

Subsidy

EPIC replaced
MEPPS in 10/01MEPPS was a
voucher system
for low income.
EPIC-insurance
program for low
income. Annual
fee-$25. Co-Paybased on income
and generic. Tax
credit-$600 for
Michigan seniors

1. MEPPS
12,591

2. Elder Prescription Insurance
Coverage Program
(EPIC)

(Tax)

2. EPIC Not
operational
as of
12/31/01

HEALTH MATRIX
MN

Minnesota's Prescription Drug
Program

Subsidy

Assistance for
65+ with incomes
below $10,308

[Vol. 12:449
5000

individual/13,932
couple. Deductible-$35/month
MS

No

MO

Tax Credit

MT

No

NE

No

NV

Nevada's Senior
Rx (Basic and Enhanced Plans)

Subsidy

65+ and income

(Tax)

less than $15,000/
year. Tax credit
equal to total
amount spent on
drugs minus reimbursements
from other
sources, with
some income
reductions.

Subsidy

62+ with income
below $21,500
State subsidy for

44, 6372

Not operational as of
12/31/01

pharmaceuticalonly insurance,
assistance based
on income and
plan preference
(Basic Plan or
Enhanced Plan)
NH

Senior Prescription
Drug Discount
Program. Scheduled to End 1/2002

Discount

Drug discounts
for 65+ with 40%
discount for generics and 15%
for brand-name
drugs.

Not operational as of
12/31/01
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NJ

Pharmaceutical
Assistance for the
Aged and Disabled
(PAAD)

NM

No

NY

Elderly Pharmaceutical Insurance
Coverage Program
(EPIC)

Subsidy

Assistance for
65+/disabled with
incomes below
$19,238 individual/23,589 couple. Co-pay-$5$5+cost difference

188,000

Subsidy

Assistance for
65+ with incomes
below $35,000
individual/50,100
couple. Fee Plan
for incomes of
less than $20,000
individual/$26,000 couple. Deductible
Plan for remain-

203,251

ing income
groups. Co-Pay$3-20 for both
plans
NC

Prescription Drug
Assistance Program

ND

No

OH

No

OK

No

Discount

Program is for
65+ diagnosed
with cardiovascular disease or
diabetes with
income less than
$12,885-Medicaid
discounted rate.
Co-pay-$6

2,070

HEALTH MATRIX
OR

No

PA

1. Pharmaceutical
Assistance Contract for the Elderly (PACE)

Subsidy

2. PACE Needs
Enhancement Tier
(PACENET)

RI

Rhode Island Pharmaceutical Assistance for the
Elderly (RIPAE)

Subsidy

[Vol. 12:449

1. Assistance for
65+w/ incomes
below $14,000
individual/17,200

1. PACE
208,000

couple.Co-pay-$6
2. Assistance for
65+ with incomes
between $1416,000 individual/17,200-19,200
couple. Co-pay$8-15. Annual
Deductible-$500

T 22,000

Assistance for
65+ with incomes
below $35,000
individual/40,100

31,000

2.PACENE

couple. Scaled
Co-pay system
based on income
SC

SILVERxCard

Subsidy

Assistance for
65+ with incomes
below $14,612
individual/19,678
couple
Deductible$500/year for full
coverage. Generic
purchasing requirements

SD

No

TN

No

TX

No

UT

No

Not operational as of
12/31/01
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1. VScript

1.Subsidy

2. Vermont Health
Access ProgramPharmacy (VHAPPharmacy)

2.Subsidy
3.Discount

1. Assistance for
65+/disabled w/
incomes $15,03321,375. Co-pays.
Annual-$24

1.5, 588
2. 9,012
3. Not operational as
of 12/31/01

2. Assistance for
65+/disabled with
incomes below
$12,885 individual/17,415 couple. Co-pays

3. Pharmacy Discount Program
(PDP)

3. Provides the
Medicaid Discount Rate for
Medicare eligible
lacking drug coverage; income
below $12,885
individual
VA

No

WA

Washington Alliance to Reduce
Prescription Drug
Spending
(AWARDS)

Discount

AWARDS invalidated by Superior
Court ruling on
5/25/01
WV

Senior Prescription
Assistance Network II (SPAN II)

WI

No

Discount for 55+
Buyers' club card
for annual fee of
$15 individual/25
couple used by

Not operational as of
12/31/01

state employees

Discount

Discounts for 65+
with incomes
below $25,050
individual/33,750
couple

2000

HEALTH MATRIX
WY

Minimum Medical
Program

Subsidy

Assistance for
non Medicaid
eligible with incomes below
$8,350. Co-pay$25. Limit co-

(Vol. 12:449
550

pay-$75/month

MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE
POLICY QUESTIONS
The implementation of an outpatient prescription drug program for Medicare presents a number of challenging practical
and theoretical issues. While this Note does not address every
issue, it outlines some of the major policy questions facing the
design of the drug program for Medicare. This discussion is intended to provide a framework for considering the various proposals before Congress. It is also intended to identify some of
the characteristics that will be essential to other Medicare reform plans and distinguish features that are unique to the question of providing outpatient prescription drug coverage to
Medicare beneficiaries.
There are both structural and theoretical issues involved in
developing a Medicare prescription drug coverage policy. The
structural issues include issues related to coverage such as who
will be covered, what drugs will be included and how the drugs
will be provided. Another set of structural issues are related to
the costs of the program and include what beneficiaries will be
responsible for paying (co-payments, deductibles, and premium
amounts), the pricing or reimbursement amounts for the drugs,
how the program will be administered, and how the costs of the
program will be covered.
There are also a number of theoretical issues. These issues
are intertwined with the structural questions. One of the first of
these is the fundamental question of whether Medicare should
be viewed as a social insurance program or benefit program. A
social insurance program is one in which the recipient is perceived to have "paid-in" for their benefits. 193 For example, like
193 MARMOR, supra note 10, at 25.
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social security, benefit programs are often linked to a history of
employment or contribution. 194 Welfare programs are programs
for those who lack the opportunity or resources for their own
care. Welfare programs are often means-tested, based on income, and are considered "give-away" programs. 195 While
Medicare is often considered a benefit program and Medicaid a
welfare program, the broad coverage of the elderly under Medicare raises concerns that aspects of the program should be
treated more as a welfare program. These concerns include the
costs of the program, the fact that not all those covered "contributed" and the fact that the contributions are less than the
demands made on the program by the beneficiaries. 196 How
Medicare is characterized in terms of its benefits defines the
depth of coverage that should be applied, and the questions of
redistribution, or the reallocation of "benefits197and burdens
among broad socioeconomic population groups."'

Another issue is whether the government should highly
regulate the program, or use prescription drug price controls.
This focuses the consideration of the level of government regulation needed to administer the set goals. A corollary to this issue is whether more market-oriented controls should be used,
such as competition. This leads to the ways competition can be
used and how the competition may need to be regulated. A final
theoretical question is the place of the proposed measure with
reference to larger policy concerns such as health care access,
cost-containment, and reform. These questions will be addressed in the context of the structural issues in laying out a
framework to understand the proposals for prescription drug
coverage.
In developing a policy for prescription drug coverage an
initial question asks whether the benefit should be available to
all beneficiaries or only to lower income or extraordinary-use
beneficiaries. 198 This is a question of universal eligibility or targeted eligibility, which "reflects a trade-off between uninsurance and limiting government costs." 199 The three options for

designing benefit coverage are coverage for all beneficiaries,
194 Id.
9
1 5 id.
196id.

197 Id.
198 McClellan et al., supra note 7, at 29.

199 Id.
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coverage for low-income beneficiaries only, and coverage for
individuals with extraordinary drug expenses only. 200 The main
concern with the low-income-targeted or extraordinary-usetargeted coverage is that it leaves many beneficiaries uninfor universal coverage is that it will
sured. 20 1 The main 2trade-off
02
be the most costly.
Universal coverage, regardless of income or need, is generally the most consistent with the Medicare program. This was
one of the main reasons for the successful enactment in 1965.203
As Theodore Marmor writes:
The selection of the aged as the problem group is
comprehensible in the context of American politics,
however distinctive it appears in comparative perspective. Unlike America, no other industrial country in the
world has begun its government health insurance program with the aged. The typical pattern has been the
initial coverage of low-income workers, with subsequent extensions to dependents and then to higher- income groups. Insuring low-income workers, however,
involves use of means tests, and the cardinal assumption of social security advocates in America has been
that the stigma of such tests must be avoided. In having
to avoid both general insurance and humiliating means
tests, the Federal Security Agency strategists were left
with finding a socioeconomic group whose average
member could be presumed to be in need. The aged
everyone intuitively knew the
passed this test easily;
2°4
aged were worst off.
The targeted approach to benefit coverage requires means testing, and is inconsistent with the federal social insurance nature
of Medicare.
Coverage only for low-income beneficiaries or extraordinary drug expenses would not protect the interests of the covered beneficiaries and there are increasing numbers of beneficiaries that would fall between the gaps. While extraordinary use
200
See id. at 29-30 (discussing the merits of targeted eligibility versus universal eligibility for prescription drug benefits).
201 Id. at 29.
=Id.at 33.

203 MARMoR, supra note 10, at 11.

2N id.
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coverage would limit excess out-of-pocket costs, beneficiaries
would still be responsible for costs up to the deductibles and
any co-insurance. However, many elderly have found difficult
even paying these amounts and with expected increases in prescription drug costs, more will-find meeting these requirements
difficult. 05 Low-income benefit coverage would also leave
many without drug coverage. Further, one study found that lack
of coverage was not overwhelmingly coordinated with income.20 6 Many States are still finding populations left without
prescription coverage even when they offer coverage for lowincome individuals. Universal coverage, while being the most
expensive, would provide the most secure coverage in a manner
consistent with the present Medicare program.
Another question of coverage is that of voluntary or
mandatory enrollment. There are two interrelated issues with
voluntary or mandatory enrollment. The first is whether people
should be able to opt-out. The second is whether people should
be allowed to buy supplemental insurance from the private sector. The value of voluntary enrollment is that it may save the
program some expense by allowing beneficiaries to compare
and opt out of the Medicare benefit. Higher income beneficiaries may desire more elaborate prescription drug plans and may
elect to pay for them. This would have the effect of a Medicare
prescription drug plan providing more targeted coverage for
lower to moderate income beneficiaries without the associated
drawbacks of a targeted program. Further, beneficiaries requiring more expensive care may opt for supplemental insurance
that would also offset some of the costs. Although there may be
concerns that employer-sponsored insurance may decrease with
the availability of a Medicare benefit or that beneficiaries would
choose the available benefit through Medicare over additional
costs, 207 incentive programs could be devised to encourage employers and supplemental insurance coverage to continue. One
way to do this is to offer subsidies to employers and private insurers carrying Medicare beneficiaries presently to continue to
offer their drug coverage. 20 8 A voluntary universal coverage
program would be the most comprehensive with some potential
savings.
205

See SHEARER, supra note 48, at 4.
206 McClellan et al., supra note 7, at 29-30 & exh. 2.
207 Id. at 32.
208 Id.
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Allowing beneficiaries to opt-out permits beneficiaries to
elect the level of their benefits while still providing a basic
package of benefits. This is similar to Medicare Part B, which
20 9
although voluntary, is still used by most Medicare enrollees.
While this opt-out provision provides a potential for costsavings, it is more protective of ensuring that all beneficiaries
can be covered. It provides at least some benefit for seniors'
medicine expenses. The issue of permitting supplemental coverage, presumably from the private sector, allows for individual
assessment of needs. It also keeps the program in competition
with private insurers for quality and offering. While this may
lead to segregation in care levels based on income, Medicare is
not intended to equalize all health care. Medicare is meant to
insure that there is a basic level of care available to beneficiaries.
A next series of structural questions address the types of
drugs and medications that should be covered by the plan. For
many common drug therapies, there are multiple drugs available
including generic versions. At the other end of the spectrum
there are drugs that may be new and/or more limited in design.
In between are various combinations of drugs that may be simi210
larly classified in their results, but act in different manners.
comOr there may be drugs that have alternative uses to their
2 11
mon use, which offer a particular patient a better result.
Equivalently, there is a spectrum of possible coverage options. At the extreme is the decision to cover all prescribed
drugs under any circumstances of prescription. This would be
very costly but would allow for the maximum coverage. Under
this inclusive policy, it would be necessary to consider ways to
control costs including fixed reimbursements and incentives for
selecting lower cost drugs. This would likely require Medicare
to determine reimbursable prices for pharmaceuticals. This
would be a heavy administrative action and would involve price
setting of pharmaceuticals by the federal government.212 Such
an action would likely meet stiff opposition by the pharmaceutical industry and would be a difficult measure for Congress to
209 MARMOR, supra note 10.

210 See Haiden A. Huskamp et al., The Medicare PrescriptionDrug Benefit:
How Will the Game be Played?, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 8, 13-14.
211See id. at 13.

212 See id. at 14 (stating that these decisions would presumably be made by
the Food and Drug Administration).
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pass. A more limited option along this spectrum would be to use
drug formularies. Drug formularies are lists of reimbursable
drugs when there are multiple drugs available. Formularies allow for cost-savings by limiting the choice of drugs, forcing
manufacturers to compete based on prices.2 13 The Medicare plan

could use formularies designed by the program administration
itself. However, there are concerns about formularies, particularly with those designed by the federal government. Formularies may not protect beneficiary needs and interests sufficiently
as they might limit access to needed medications. Also, formulanes established by the federal government may cause controversy in limiting access to FDA-approved treatments. Medicaid
programs were prohibited from using formularies under the
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990. However, the public
benefit in coverage and cost containment available might mitigate these concerns.
A popular method presently used by private insurance programs that Medicare could adopt is to contract with pharmaceutical management firms. These firms are known as pharmaceutical benefit management companies (PBMs). PBMs negotiate
with drug manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies largely
based on drug formularies, saving money through rebates and
discounts. One of the drawbacks of the use of PBMs is that they
have the potential to create regional monopolies under Medicare
contracts, potentially leading to unintended repercussions, like
limiting which medications are available to beneficiaries in a
region based on the contracts established.214
Another consideration for policy is how coverage for a
'drug benefit will be provided. This is intricately linked to measures and theories of cost-containment. This presents the conflict
between government regulation and market-oriented tactics to
control costs. The primary method of government regulation
would be the use of price controls to set the price paid for various drugs. This approach would be similar to prospective payment methods used for both outpatient and inpatient Medicare
coverage. In this way, Medicare could set prices or reimbursements for prescription medications and pay pharmacies or drug
213 See
214

id. at 13.

See Patricia M. Danzon, PharmaceuticalBenefit Management: An Alter-

native Approach, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 24, 24 (discussing the benefits of
using competing pharmacy benefit managers in Medicare programs as opposed to the
traditional monopoly PBM).
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providers based on these values. While this method may be the
most effective for controlling costs, it is also likely to meet with
greater resistance from pharmaceutical companies and pharmacists, creating an impediment to the successful passage of a
proposal for drug benefits.
Market-based approaches to cost-containment focus on
competition. Two models of competition have been proposed
for prescription drug benefit programs. The first is competition
among eligible providers of drug benefits (like PMBs) for enrollees.215 The second is competition for contracts to be a regional
provider of prescription benefits.2 1 6 Competition for enrollees
presents adverse selection problems while regional contract
competition
217 creates anti-competitive disadvantages and antitrust
problems.
Further, regional contract competition relies on
providers limiting drug selection to reduce costs. One paper
suggested the use of tiered incentive pricing to avoid this problem. Tiered pricing would allow companies to scale prices in a
way that encourages use of lowest cost drugs while maintaining
choice.218
Cost is a major factor in considering a prescription drug
benefit. Although predicting the cost of a future program is difficult, cost estimates may provide a starting point for a cost
benefit weighing of various aspects of the proposals. In 2000,
Medicare covered thirty-nine million beneficiaries at a cost of
$220 billion.219 These costs were split between Medicare Part A,
which was responsible for about sixty percent, and Medicare
Part B, which were responsible for about forty percent. 220 A
portion of the Social Security payroll tax pays for Medicare Part
A. Medicare Part B is financed from a mixture of general revenues and premiums paid by enrollees. The premiums contribute
only about twenty-five percent of the costs of Medicare Part
B 221

215 See Huskamp et al., supra note 210, at 10-12.
216 See id.

217 Id.
218
See id. at 11.
219 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY

PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 23 (Apr. 2002), availableat http://www.house.
gov/budget
democrats/presbudgetsfy2OOl/cbo-analysispresbud0l.pdf.
0

22Id.

221Id. at 40 tbl.2-5.
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Medicare costs increased dramatically from its beginnings,
growing faster than the economy for twenty years.222 The rising
costs of the Medicare program have only recently begun to slow
down.223 Over the next few years, the baby-boomers will begin
to become part of the Medicare population. This will lead to a
greater demand on Medicare resources. The work force population will shrink and not be able to match the financial demands
on the Medicare program resulting from this growth. Although
recent slowing of Medicare's inflation has encouraged benefit
expansion consideration, there are serious concerns about the
future demands on Medicare and its limited ability to meet the
added costs.
Estimating the costs of the proposals is difficult given the
limited data and uncertainty, but a study by the National Academy of Social Insurance used five scenarios to compare benefit
proposals.2 24 In their study, they found that estimated costs were
less over time for a benefit program that had a maximum benefit
level than for a program that had a maximum out-of-pocket iability (i.e., a catastrophic loss protection). 22
Their study also showed that a lower deductible and a
higher percentage of co-insurance combined had the best effect
in slowing the growth in costs of a program.226 In this study
they compared deductibles of $200 with $500. They compared
co-insurance contributions of twenty percent with fifty percent.
As might be expected the most effective combination of
controlling costs was a $200 deductible and a fifty percent coinsurance.227
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has evaluated the
costs of adding a prescription drug benefit based on Clinton's
proposal.228 The Clinton plan is most similar to the Senate De230
mocratic Plan, 229 S. 10, sponsored by Tom Daschle (D-S.D.).
This plan would cover at least fifty percent of all beneficiaries'
premiums from general revenue funds.23' Further, reimburse222

MARMOR, supra note 10, at 189-91.

223 CONG. BUDGET OFFcE, supra note 219, at 39.
"4 GLUCK, supra note 12, at 6-9.

22'See id. at
226

7 tbl.4
id.
227 See id. at 7 tbl.4 (resulting in a 7.2% increase in Medicare costs).
228 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supranote 219, at 49-55.
229 Iglehart, supra note 111, at 1013.
230

S. 10, 107th Cong. (2001).
21 Id. § 3.
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232
ments would be made for large out-of-pocket expenditures.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the proposal for a drug benefit would cost $149 billion over a decade. 3 Some of the costs of this program would be defrayed by
the collection of the premiums, which would increase over
time. 4 The proposal does not include catastrophic coverage
protection. The plan covers all beneficiaries to $5,000. The
CBO estimates the Bush proposal to cost $158 billion over a
decade, using vouchers to encourage enrollment in private organizations, his plan would pay for twenty-five percent of premium costs.
Taken together, these cost studies suggest a number of important influences on the cost of a program. The first is that
premium contribution is very significant in program cost differences.2 35 Clinton's proposal offered fifty percent premium coverage and would have been almost three times as expensive as
Bush's plan, which offers to pay twenty-five percent for all enrollees. This was also demonstrated in the NASI study. However the Clinton Plan would attempt to offset program costs by
applying premiums directly to prescription drug costs.
The second influence is the inclusion of a stop loss provision-a provision which allows for Medicare to be covered for
costs exceeding a certain level, or a maximum benefit. Catastrophic coverage drives costs of a program proposal to nearly
double that of a maximum benefit proposal after twenty
years.236 Catastrophic coverage is the coverage for high cost
medical care, in this instance high cost prescription drugs. The
maximum benefit is more stable while the costs of catastrophic
coverage continue to grow.237 As described above, a lower deductible and a higher co-insurance both reduce expenditures
over time.
One suggestion from the CBO analysis is that competition
reduces costs. Bush's proposal utilizes private market forces
much more than Clinton's proposal. Even though there is a
premium differential, the private market influence may lessen
costs. A CBO study suggested this might be true when they
232 See id.
233 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 219, at 51.
2 id.
235 See e.g., GLUCK, supra note 12, at 6-9.
236 See id. at 7 fig.1.
237 See id.
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compared Clinton's plan in 1998 with a Democratic House proposal.238 They were very similar plans, but the House proposal
cost less because it relied on competition among providers of
coverage. 39
A final structural issue is how a prescription drug plan
should be administered. Possible plan administrative measures
might include the creation of a separate program outside of
Medicare, the creation of a specialized committee or department
to oversee the drug benefits, or the creation of committees to
oversee specific aspects of a program such as price determinations or drug evaluations. Structural administration of a plan
relies on the degree of detail in the running of the plan; how the
plan relates to other Medicare components; and whether the
administration is more involved and requires greater specialized
knowledge. Finally, administration of the plan may increase
cost. If the plan requires new agency and support personnel, this
may be more expensive than using available resources.

PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROPOSALS
This paper looks at four congressional proposals for a drug
benefit addition to the Medicare program. They are Senate Bill
10, House Bill 803, Senate Bill 358 and House Bill 339. These
proposals represent the range of different approaches to various
structural and theoretical issues but also some areas of similarity among the plans. Each of the proposals offer voluntary enrollment to all beneficiaries, making the plans all consistent
with broader coverage of the population. All the plans, except
H.R.339 offer subsidies of premiums to low-income beneficiaries. The plans all utilize some form of price controls for drug
coverage, with H.R.339 using government payment limits and
the other proposals using more competitive methods. Comparisons of certain features of these proposals are presented in Table 3.
A. Senate Bill 10
Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.) sponsored S.10, which is cosponsored by liberal democrats. 24° It is most similar to President

238 See CONG. BuDGEr OFFICE, supra note 219.
239 See id.
240
See S. 10, 107th Cong. (2001).
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Clinton's prescription drug plan.24 1 Like the Clinton plan, it is a
partially capped co-insurance plan. This bill "reflects the
Democratic preference for providing partial coverage of routine
drug expenditures for most Medicare beneficiaries and providing greater coverage for the large, unexpected drug costs incurred by a small proportion of beneficiaries." 242
The plan creates a Medicare Part D, which is specifically
for prescription coverage. 243 However, the premium costs of this
Part D coverage are calculated separately from the Part B premium. 244 The premium is used to cover almost fifty percent of
the drug benefit program.
This proposal best demonstrates the use of competition for
regional contracts. 245 Eligible providers like PBMs, retail pharmacies, health plans, and States or combinations of these entities can submit bids to the Secretary of Health.246 The use of
formularies is encouraged.24 7 It modifies Medicare+Choice
plans to require a prescription drug benefit. 248 This bill is presently in the Senate Finance Committee, which is hearing testimony on a prescription drug benefit under Medicare.
B. House Bill 803
H.R.803 is a bill sponsored by Pete Stark (D-Cal.). 249 It is
part of a larger Medicare reform bill that is not just a prescription drug benefit. The benefit would be offered under Medicare
Part B. This proposal uses competition among pharmaceutical
providers but would be a closer example of competition for enrollees than the S.10 regional contract competition. The proposal allows for "any willing pharmacy" to participate as long
as they meet the requirements.2 0 It is like S.10 with coverage
for extraordinary use, except that it contains greater provisions
for catastrophic stop-loss. President Bush has endorsed this

241Iglehart, supra note 111, at 1013.
242

Id.
243 S. 10, § 3 (2001).
244

Id.at § 5.
245
See id. at § 3 (governing enrollment).
246
Id.at§ 3.
247 See id.
248 See id.
24 9

H.R.803, 107th Cong. (2001).
0H.R. 803, § 201.
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bill.251 This is a modified version of the Kennedy-Stark bill
from last session, although it has some capped co-insurance
provisions. This bill has recently been referred to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health.
C. Senate Bill 358
S.358 is also called the Breaux-Frist II, a scaled down proposal of Medicare reforms proposed following the NBCMR,
52
focused on providing a prescription drug coverage benefit.2
Although this represents a bipartisan approach, Breaux (D-La.)
is interested in market approaches to Medicare reform. Frist (RTenn.) is also a private market proponent.
This proposal has many unique features. First, it would
establish a new agency, called the Medicare Competition
Agency, to run the Medicare Prescription Drug and
Supplemental Benefit Program. 254 A Commissioner of this
program would run the agency but would also be a trustee for
the Medicare Supplemental Trust Fund.255
The benefits would be offered to enrollees on a voluntary
basis under the Medicare Prescription Plus plan. 256 This plan
would be available either through Medicare+Choice plans or
private insurance.257 There would be competition for enrollees
based on the supplemental insurance package for prescription
drugs offered. 5 While this would utilize Medicare's existing
supplemental insurance program, it relies on competition at the
level of plan offering, unlike S.10 and H.R.803, which have enrollees in a Medicare plan but introduce competition at the level
of drug purchasing and providing. One concern with the
Breaux-Frist proposal is the possibility that private plans for a
drug benefit will parallel the problems that occurred when pri"251 See Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary
(Aug. 3, 2001), availableat http:/www.whitehouse.gov/newslreleases/2001/08/printt
20010803-1.html.
252 S.358, 107th Cong. (2001).
253 BILL FRIST, MEDICARE REFORM AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (n.d.) (discussing proposed improvements to the Medicare+Choice program under the Breaux-Frist
bill), at http:llwww.senate.gov/-fristlHealth-Agenda.2000/MedicareReform (last

visited Jan. 24,2002).
2m S.358, § 101.
25 5
Id. §§ 101, 102.
256

S.358, § 201.

257

FRIST, supra note 253.

z 8 Id.
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vate HMOs were permitted to cover Medicare and Medicaid
patients.25 9 These programs initially enrolled many beneficiaries
with the promise of more and better health coverage than the
traditional Medicare fee-for-service coverage. However, many
of these plans ran into financial difficulties in covering high
demand, high cost populations. Many Medicare and Medicaid
beneficiaries were left without coverage as these plans went
bankrupt or pulled out of the programs. Similarly, private prescription drug programs may initially offer inexpensive good
coverage and enroll a number of beneficiaries and then be unable to provide the coverage at competitive prices, leaving the
traditional Medicare program to carry these beneficiaries. It is
possible, though, that the private market for prescription drug
coverage may be able to reduce costs because of strong negotiations with PBMs and pharmacies.
D. House Bill 339
House Bill 339 is sponsored by Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.) and is
co-sponsored by other House Democrats. 2 50 This plan is an
example of a prescription benefit program that uses price setting
for drug payments by the Medicare program. The prices would
be set based on regional prices and would use a 90th percentile
value of the customary levels for various drugs. 261 This is the
only plan that prohibits the use of formularies. 262 It establishes a
new committee to set the payment limits for drugs. This system
is similar to the manner in which Medicare makes payments under Part B for physician services with their Resource Based
Relative Value Scale (RBRVS). A concern in using a 90th percentile value for the customary charges is that it may encourage
pharmacies to raise prices in order to recoup the loss. In this,
there is an incentive to raise prices because the price paid is
based on the amount customarily charged. It is presently in the
Committee on Energy and Commerce as well as the Committee
on Ways and Means and has recently been referred to the Subcommittee on Health.

259 See Iglehart, supra note 111, at 1013 (noting Senator Thomas's recognition that260
the Medicare+Choice programs have failed many elderly persons).
H.R. 339, 107th Cong. (2001).
261Id. § 2(c)(3).
262
d. § 2(c)(5).
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Table 3. Comparison of Congressional Medicare Prescription
Drug Proposals, 2001.
Plan

Participation and
Enrollment

S.10

H.R.803

S.358

H.R.339

(Daschle)

(Stark)

(BreauxFrist)

(Engel)
All Beneficiaries

All Beneficiaries
Voluntary

All Beneficiaries
Voluntary

All Beneficiaries
Voluntary

Enrollment

Enrollment

Enrollment

Inclusion in
Medicare
Program

Under Medicare Part D

Under Medicare Part B

Medicare+Choice

Premiums

Monthly

Monthly

Premiumsdiffer if collected from
beneficiary
or employer

Premiums

Lowincome
Subsidies

Low income
beneficiaries
with no
premiums or
co-insurance

Low income
beneficiaries
with no premiums or coinsurance

Full coverage
for lowincome
beneficiaries
at 150% of
poverty
level-phasing
up

How Provided

Eligible
PBMs, retail
pharmacies,
health plans,
states, combinations

Eligible
PBMs, retail
pharmacies,
health plans,
states, combinations

Some Catastrophic coyerage

Catastrophic
Coverage
Provisions

Eligible entities like
PBMs, pharmacies,
health plans,
may contract
with Medicare Committee
Some Catastrophic coverage

Under Medicare Part B

496
Competition
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Bidding for
regional providing based
on drug
prices,
charges to
programCompetition
for enrollees

Price Controls

Permits formularies

Bidding for
regional providing based
on drug
prices, charges
to program-
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Competition
among eligible entities
for enrollees

Competition
for enrollees

Permits formularies

Permits formularies

Payment
Limits similar to
RBRVSgeographic
variations,
90% price
Prohibits
Formularies

Co-Pays

Co-insurance
from 0-50%
based on outof-pocket
expenses

Scaled coinsurance

Co-insurance
of 50%-limit
at 2,100None at
$6,000 outof-pocket

Coinsurance20%

Deductibles

$250 (may be
waived for

$250

$250

$250

generic
drugs)
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Where is
the $ coming from?

Premiums
and Federal
Supplemental
Medical Insurance Trust
Fund

Premiums and
Federal Supplemental
Medical Insurance Trust
Fund

Separate
Fund not
Supp. Med.
Ins. Trust
Fund-

Federal Supplemental
Medical Insurance Trust
Fund

Premiums
Limit to only
40% from
General
Revenues

4

F

Administrat
ion

Medicare

Medicare

Secretary of
Health

Secretary of
Health

New committee to oversee Prescription Drug
ProgramMedicare
Competitive
and Prescription
Drug Program CommitteeCommittee
Head is also
on Board of
Trustees of
Medicare
Trust

Secretary of
HealthMedicare but
new committee for price
setting
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Estimated
Costs (if
available)
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$338 billion
in new federal costs
from 2001-

2010.263

MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROPOSAL
AND TIlE PROSPECTS FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACTION
The need for adequate prescription drug coverage among
the elderly population is reaching the level of a crisis. 2 6 Seniors
are the highest consumers of prescription medications. 265 Most
seniors receive their health care coverage under Medicare, but
because Medicare does not offer prescription coverage, meeting
this need requires supplemental insurance.266 Seniors have more
limited income and employment and are therefore less likely 267
to
own.
their
on
medications
these
for
paying
be able to afford
While some seniors have prescription drug coverage, many do
not and the coverage that they have is often inadequate. 268 Fur-

ther, the high cost of coverage is causing fewer employers to
offer this coverage and reducing the ability of other programs to
meet this need.26
The state assistance programs for drug coverage are not
sufficient to meet the demands of this potential crisis for cover263

GLUCK, supra note 7, at 10. This proposal is most similar to President

Clinton's proposal.
264 See SHEARER, supra note 48 (reporting statistics associated with rising
costs to seniors).
265 See id. at 2 (stating that older Americans, while accounting for just twelve
percent of the population, are responsible for one-third of spending on prescription
drugs). 266
See GLUCK, supra note 12, at 1.
267 See SHEARER, supra note 48, at 2 (noting that of those aged sixty-five and
older, fifty-seven percent spend more than ten percent of their income on out-ofpocket health care costs).
m See id. at 2-3 (finding that the oldest Medigap policy holders can often
have the most expenses policies, since premiums increase with age); Stuart et al.,
supra note 58, at 82 (reporting that fewer than half of all beneficiaries had continuous
drug coverage and nearly one-third, gained, lost, or had intermittent coverage);
Pourat et al., supra note 58, at 186 (finding that those who are more disadvantaged
are less likely to have any supplemental coverage).
269 See generally Pear, supra note 35 (indicating that employer-provided
benefits have increased in cost).
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age. Medicaid programs cover low-income seniors with prescription drug coverage but this does not offer assistance to
many elderly who are not income-based eligible for Medicaid
but still cannot afford the monthly costs of their medication
needs. 270 State plans to expand coverage are susceptible to challenges. State plans are also not uniform and while the laboratory
of state programs may appear at first blush an effective way to
address this problem, it is not. A variety of programs operated
by the States means that many drug companies and chain pharmacies are faced with the potential of meeting fifty different
sets of rules and requirements. The lack of uniformity in State
approaches means that at the best, States are offering some seniors more assistance than others, and at the worst, States' assistance ranges from none to full assistance.
This disparity is unacceptable in a population whose health
care needs are to be protected by an entitlement program. Medicare is health coverage for the elderly. Prescription drugs have
become an essential part of health care in this country. The fact
that their role was not as prevalent at Medicare's enactment
does not decrease their present necessity.
There must be a federal response to this problem. Medicare
must make prescription drug coverage available to all seniors.
As prescription drug costs increase, more and more seniors will
be made vulnerable to the high costs of meeting their health
care needs. If coverage is only provided to low income or highuse beneficiaries, many people will be left uncovered over time.
Unless all beneficiaries are covered, the legislature will always
be forced to grapple with the next group that is left just outside
the eligibility for assistance, but without the ability to provide
for them.
A drug benefit program under Medicare should be voluntary. Although covering all beneficiaries is one of the leading
factors in the cost of this program, it is the most imperative to
ensuring basic health care coverage for seniors and meeting this
problem directly. One potential way to offset some of this cost
is to permit seniors to opt-out if they wish. The voluntary nature
of the program also adds an element of competition based on
quality of program. If the Medicare program is not adequate,
seniors can choose other programs or elect not to participate as
a way to voice dissatisfaction. The four congressional proposals
270 See GLUCK supra note

12, at 4.
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HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 12:449

are intended to provide assistance to all beneficiaries; they all
provide greater assistance for lower-income elderly, and are all
voluntary programs.
A Medicare prescription drug proposal that is made available to all beneficiaries must control costs. There are two overarching ways to control costs for providing benefits to all seniors. The first is to limit the scope of the benefits and the second
is to limit the amount paid for the benefit. Benefit limitations
may come in the form of restricting covered medications to certain illnesses, or in setting up formularies and tiered formularies, which restrict the brands of drugs covered. Coverage for
prescription medications only for certain illnesses is rationing.
This presents problems of evaluating the needs of different people with respect to their health and considering the impact on
the population as a whole. This is a very difficult way to limit
costs because it limits care and it would leave many uncovered
for their needs. Formularies limit the choice of drug used to
treat a particular illness. Since formularies often reflect a "deal"
on the costs of a particular drug, this may be a useful method to
control costs. The use of tiered formularies, where beneficiaries
have options for higher cost drugs by contributing additional
money, offers a method to control costs but also provides
choice.
Price controls are essential to controlling the huge expense
of a prescription drug program. The question of how best to
control these costs relies to some degree on whether government regulation or market competition controls are desired. A
more regulatory approach is for the government to set and pay
only certain price values. The Medicare program already sets
and pays fixed prices for some services. 2 71 The limitations of
this approach are that it may impact pharmaceutical companies'
ability to recoup costs or to continue research and development.27 2 The government would then be the largest purchaser of
goods and would have unprecedented control of ancillary markets to the Medicare program. The only congressional proposal
to suggest this is H.R.339, the Engel bill. This method would be
very difficult to pass and might lead to pharmaceutical companies being unwilling to participate.
271 Under

payments.

272

Medicare Part A there are diagnostically related group prospective

See generally Pear, supra note 35 (discussing the rising costs of pharma-

ceuticals and its contributing factors).
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Increased competition is often cited as the health care market's cost control answer. There are various levels where competition can be introduced into a prescription drug plan, but the
two models most often discussed are competition for contracts
and competition for enrollees.2 7 3 Although there is some overlap, generally competition for contracts is competition at the
product level (prescription drugs) and competition for enrollees
is competition at the provider level (prescription drug plans).
The Daschle plan in the Senate and the Stark plan in the House
both use competition for contracts.2 7 4 The Breaux-Frist II plan is
competition for enrollees.2 7 5 All three of these plans permit the
use of formularies.2 7 6 There is an advantage for price controls
with the competition at the level of product or for contracts.
Medicare has greater negotiation power and information in deciding particular contracts to accept. Further, there is more
competition among product competitors, in this case the PBMs,
manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and pharmacies. Under
the competition for enrollees, there would be competition between private coverage groups and Medicare+Choice plans. 7
Another key issue in designing a benefit is the amount of
responsibility that beneficiaries should have for their coverage.
This includes the amounts of premiums, co-insurance and deductibles to be paid by beneficiaries. Premiums, as demonstrated by the cost analysis by the CBO of the Clinton plan, can
significantly contribute to paying for the program. 8 This contribution is important to controlling the cost of the program.
Both deductibles and co-insurance can be used to reduce the
costs over time to the program as well. 279 A lower deductible
and a higher co-insurance combine to be the most effective at
slowing costs. Although catastrophic coverage should be considered eventually for a prescription drug benefit, it is highly
expensive. Initial enactment of a benefit should focus on cover273 See McClellan et al., supra note 7, at 35-36.
274 S. 10, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001); H.R. 803, 107th
275

Cong. § 201 (2001).
See S. 358, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001) (indicating that eligible beneficiaries

will make
276 an election to enroll in the program).
See S. 10, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001); S. 358, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001); H.R.
803, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
277 See S. 358, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001) (indicating enrollees has choice
between278entitles).
See Iglehart, supra note 111, at 1013 (stating that $152 billion of the $442
billion Clinton
drug plan would be paid by premiums).
279
See GLUCK, supra note 12, at 6-9.
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ing all beneficiaries for most of their needs with some protections for catastrophic coverage (capped co-insurance).
Finally, if a prescription drug plan covers all beneficiaries
and is run based on competing contracts to control prices, the
administration of this program may be quite time-consuming
and complicated. Since prescription drug coverage will be an
addition to the Medicare program, it seems necessary to have a
specialized section for this benefit integrated into the Medicare
administration as a whole. Further, the financial demands of this
program may require that the finances be separated some from
the other Medicare program finances. The Breaux-Frist II proposal is the only proposal to address these administrative demands of initiating such a large program. None of the proposals
before Congress offer all of the described elements for a strong
prescription drug benefit, although S.10, H.R.803 and S.358
each have certain of the attributes.
Politics will have a large impact on whether a prescription
drug benefit gets passed and in what form it gets passed. The
political climate at the initial passage of Medicare was unique.
At that time, there was a newly elected Democratic president,
280
President Johnson, and a Democratically controlled Congress.
There was also overwhelming public support for the passage of
a health care program for the aging.
Presently, there is a
newly elected Republican President from a very close election.
The Congress is very evenly split, although Democrats have a
slight majority. There is large public support for prescription
drug coverage but also public recognition of the cost of the
Medicare program, the future financial problems of the program, and the imminent future growth of the Medicare population.282 Another voice in the political discussion is that of the
pharmaceutical industry. Although there is less challenge of a
Medicare prescription drug benefit, they will be an interested
party aiming to preserve their revenues and limit government
intervention.
President Bush's two-part strategy for creating a Medicare
drug benefit is based largely on the Federal Employees Health
Benefit Program and the previous recommendations of the
NBCFM. Recent changes in Congressional committee leader280 MARMOR,
281

supra note 10, at 45.
Id.
282 See Iglehart, supra,note 111.
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ship, however, may make passage of his programs difficult. The
new chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Chuck Grassley
(R-Iowa), has experience with Medicare policy. He was on the
Senate Special Committee for the Aging. He initially announced
that the Senate would not consider Bush's Medicare reform
programs this session in order to try to pass a drug benefit for
Medicare. He also announced his opposition to expanding state
programs.283 The new chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee is Representative Bill Thomas (R-Cal.). Thomas was
also the co-chair of NBCFM, and although he has worked with
Breaux, he does not support creating a drug benefit around
Medicare+Choice. 284 He also announced his opposition to
President Bush's state expansion plans. 285 Finally, the new
chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee is
W.J. Tauzin (R-La.).
The present political climate means that the key to passage
of a prescription drug benefit is "bipartisanship." The influence
of the NBCFM is meaningful here. President Bush's general
support for the recommendations of the NBCFM suggests some
shared views with the Breaux-Frist proposal. However, Breaux
is a Democrat and although, his bill is co-sponsored by a Republican, some key Republican leaders oppose the Breaux-Frist
II plan. Similarly, large Democratic support for either S.10 or
H.R.803 suggests that Democrat support for the Breaux-Frist
proposal will be limited. Democratic proposals are more expensive and will be hard to bring to the table following passage of
Bush's 1.6 trillion-dollar tax cut. 286 This tax cut is expected to
make passage of any Medicare prescription drug plan this year
unlikely. Votes on the tax cut reflected much partisanship and it
is likely that bipartisanship will be difficult to achieve when
even party agreement is difficult to reach. A Medicare prescription drug benefit discussion will continue to be a prominent and
divisive issue for Congress.

283

Iglehart, supra note 111, at 1013.

2'a See id.
215 See id.
286 See Bush Tax Cut,supra note 186.
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LESSONS FOR LARGE-SCALE MEDICARE
REFORM?
At the beginning of the 107th Congressional session, the
prospects for passage of a prescription drug benefit appeared
more likely than they do presently. Since the passage of the
original Medicare program, there has not been such single party
control and coordination of the legislative and executive
branches on Medicare proposals. 287 In large part this is due to
the dramatic expansion of this program and fundamental differences on how to run Medicare. However, there are still promising points of agreement between the parties on prescription drug
coverage under this program.
Both parties recognize the need for coverage among the
elderly population. They also appear to agree that Medicare
should be involved in eventually providing some of this coverage. There is agreement that a benefit should be available to all
beneficiaries with additional assistance to lower-income elderly
and some protection for high-use beneficiaries. For the most
part, based somewhat on the influence of President Clinton's
health plan of 1993 and the work of NBCFM, most major proposals are considering the use of competition to achieve price
controls.
These similarities however mask certain trends in the substantive development of Medicare policy and regulation. According to Jon Oberlander, a political scientist, there are three
substantive features to Medicare's politics. 88 These are struggles over benefits, struggles over financing, and struggles over
federal payments. 289 The struggle over benefits has been a characterized as "non-distributive." This means that there has not
been expansion of Medicare's benefits even when demand for
these is strong. The struggle over finances has been characterized as the struggle of crises. This reflects the trend of addressing financial concerns, premium levels and funding, when bankruptcy or financial security of the program is in question. Finally the struggles of federal payment have been concerned with

287 See MARMOR, supra note 10, at 45; Iglehart, supra note 111, at 1012
(discussing the political players involved).
288 MARMOR, supra note 10, at 182 (citing Oberlander, J.B., Medicare and the
American State, dissertation, Yale University, 1995).
289 Id.
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the regulatory politics of paying providers. Often these reforms
have been coordinated with financing struggles.
The trends suggest that expansion of the Medicare program
is usually hampered by financing and payment concerns. However, the prescription drug benefit may have the advantage of
being considered during a time of, and in the context of, both
financial and regulatory reforms for payments. The trends of the
benefit proposals suggest that both parties are viewing Medicare
as a social entitlement program and that coverage of a benefit
must be for all beneficiaries. Further, the emphasis, even among
Democrats, of market principles and managed competition suggest a continued approach to controlling costs through a mixed
government/market approach. A prescription drug benefit may
be viewed as the trial case, testing these approaches with the
intention of implementing them in larger scale reform plans. In
sum, the struggles over providing a benefit may become a crisis
political issue, as the lack of coverage for medications among
the elderly continues to increase health care costs impacting the
States and the Medicare Program.

